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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF STATE OF UTAH

JOHN D. HALE
Plaintiff/ Petitioner,
CaseNo.20030641-SC
vs.
KURT BECKSTEAD and JOHN
DOES I through V,

Priority No. 12

Defendants / Respondents.

PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON CERTIORARI

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN, §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2a-4.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in concluding that the Utah Supreme Court had
overruled, sub silento, Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App.l989)5 and, in so
doing, err in affirming the district court's conclusion that Beckstead owed Hale no duty of
care.
Because the determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate presents a
question of law, the decision of the lower court is afforded no deference. See Doit, Inc. v.
louche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 841 (Utah 1996). Moreover, "the issue ofKwhether a

"duty" exists is a question of law5 which [the appellate court] review[s] for correctness.55
Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1998) (quoting Weber v.
Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360,1363 (Utah 1986)).

CITATION TO THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The subject decision of the Utah Court of Appeals was published as Hale v.
Beckstead, 2003 UT App 240, 74 P.3d 628.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
There is no constitutional or statutory text the interpretation of which is
determinative in deciding the issue presented by this petition.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Proceeding. This is a petition by which Plaintiff and Petitioner, John D. Hale,
has sought review of a decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, Honorable Judges Judith
M. Billings, Gregory K. Orme, and William A. Thorne, Jr., sitting.

Course of Proceedings in Lower Courts. Plaintiff initiated a suit for damages against
Defendant in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County, the Honorable G.
Rand Beacham presiding. Defendant moved for summary judgment contending that
because Plaintiff was an independent contractor whose performance was not supervised
by Defendant, Defendant owed Plaintiff "no duty of care concerning the safety of the
manner or method of performance implemented." R 63. Defendant argued that no duty
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existed because Beckstead as "an employer or owner that does not control the work of the
independent contractor has no duty to provide a safe workplace to the employees of the
independent contractor." R 63. Defendant touted Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah
1999), and Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 2775148 P. 408 (1914), as "[t]he two authoritative
cases in this area of the law." R 63. The district court agreed and dismissed Plaintiffs
complaint. Plaintiff appealed.

Disposition in the Utah Court of Appeals. On appeal, the court of appeals correctly
concluded that the analysis Beckstead had offered was incorrect and that "Hale was a
business visitor, an invitee on Beckstead's land—a status wholly separate from any status
he may have had as an independent contractor." Hale, 2003 UT App 240 at ^[ 11, fh 2.
As such, Beckstead's reliance on Thompson and Dayton was misplaced. Id. While the
court of appeals rejected the theory Beckstead advanced, that court affirmed the summary
judgment concluding that Beckstead owed no duty of care to Hale as a business visitor,
under the open and obvious danger rule.
With a footnote in the majority's opinion, the court of appeals concluded that the
Utah Supreme Court in House v. Armour of America, Inc. 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996) had,
sub silento, overruled Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). On that
basis, the court of appeals determined that the open and obvious danger rule was an
absolute bar to recovery under Utah premises liability law. See Hale, 2003 UT App 240
at Tj 9, fn 1. The majority of the court of appeals panel undertook to apply the open and
obvious danger rule, as outlined in sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement (Second) of
3

Torts, without reference to the principles of comparative negligence and, in so doing,
concluded that because Hale was a business visitor, "Beckstead was relieved of any duty
to Hale." Hale, 2003 UT App 240 at \ 24.

RELEVANT FACTS1
1. Plaintiff complains in this action of injuries he received in a fall. R 100, ^[ 1.
2. Defendant was the owner of the property at which Plaintiff fell. R 100, ^j 2.
3. A home was under construction on Defendant's property, and Plaintiff was
inside the partially completed home at the time of Plaintiff s fall. R 101, ^j 3.
4. Defendant was acting as his own "general contractor" for the construction of
the home. R101,TJ4.
5. Defendant hired Plaintiff to paint the home. R 101, \ 5.
6. Defendant told Plaintiff generally how the paint should look and bought the
paint for Plaintiff to use. R 101, ^ 6.
7. Defendant did not control or direct the manner in which Plaintiff was to paint
the home. R 101,H 7.
8. While inside the partially constructed home, Plaintiff inadvertently stepped off
a second floor balcony and fell to the first level. R 101,1} 8.
9. There is no evidence that Plaintiff had authority to enter Defendant's premises
for any purpose other than to complete his contract to paint the home. R 101, ^ 9.

^he first ten numbered paragraphs are verbatim reproductions of the uncontested
material facts which the district court identified in support of its ruling. See R 100-101.
4

10. Defendant was not in the home when Plaintiff fell, but was out of town on an
extended vacation. R 101, ^| 10.
11. The edge of the balcony in question was unprotected and in excess of 6 feet
(1.8 m) above the lower level. R 3,ffi[11-12.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court of appeals erred in concluding that the Utah Supreme Court had
overruled, sub silento, Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App.1989) in House
v. Armour ofAmerica, Inc., 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996). Since the decision in Donahue
was announced, Utah courts have consistently held that Utah's Comparative Negligence
Act subsumes the open and obvious danger rule, when a landowner controls or maintains
an unsafe condition on his property. Donahue v. Durfee, supra] and Laws v. Blanding
City, 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah App. 1995).
The court of appeals' interpretation of House v. Armour ofAmerica, Inc., 929 P,2d
340 (Utah 1996) is misplaced. In House, this Court distinguished Donahue, a premises
liability case, from the operation of the open and obvious danger rule in the strict products
liability claim at issue in House. In no event did this Court overrule Donahue by
implication or otherwise as it pertains to premises liability cases. Assuming for the sake
of argument the strict products liability principles discussed in House apply to premises
liability cases, Beckstead is still not absolved of liability for maintaining an unsafe
condition if it would have been economically feasible for him to protect against the
danger.

In conformity with Donahue and the subsequent premises liability cases, the open
and obvious danger rule as set forth in sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts maintains a presence in the distribution of responsibility between the
landowner and the landowner's guest in considering all the circumstances. However, the
fact alone that an open and obvious danger exists does not automatically cancel all duty
the landowner may have owed to his guests in the context of Utah's Comparative
Negligence Act or sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Beckstead owed a duty to Hale when he invited Hale to paint in the vicinity of an
unenclosed second-story balcony on his property. The court of appeals' decision
essentially wipes out all consideration of the duty Beckstead owed Hale based upon a
mis-application of House. In light of the fact that Utah's Comparative Negligence Act
has displaced the "all or nothing" effect of contributory negligence theories, Donahue and
its progeny are the appropriate standards for balancing the relative duties of the
landowner and his guests. Whether the landowner's maintenance of an open and obvious
danger or the guest's culpability in sustaining injury in the all the circumstances is a
question for the trier of fact to consider. Accordingly, the court of appeals' decision in
this case should be reversed.

ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
UTAH SUPREME COURT HAD OVERRULED DONAHUE V. DURFEE,
SUB SILENTO IN HOUSE V. ARMOUR OF AMERICA, INC
In cases involving licensees and business invitees, a premises liability claim is, in
6

substance, a negligence claim wherein the degree of the duty of care owed by the
possessor of the premises is determined by the status the claimant enjoys. See Donahue v.
Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App.1989) (comparative negligence applied in premises
liability case); Laws v. Blanding City, 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah Ct. App.1995).
In Donahue, the plaintiff was installing rain gutter on the roof of a warehouse
when he stood up and came in contact with an electrical line. He had earlier noted the
proximity of the line but had not been expressly warned of it. The district court granted
the defendants summary judgment, concluding the power line in question constituted an
open and obvious danger and that, accordingly, defendants owed no duty to warn
Donahue of the danger or otherwise protect him from it. Reversing the dismissal of
Donahue's complaint, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded:
Utah has now abandoned its contributory negligence system. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-38 (1987), entitled "Comparative Negligence/5 provides in
part that "the fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery
by that person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants
whose fault exceeds his own." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(2) defines
"fault" as "any actionable breach of legal duty... including, but not limited
to, negligence in all its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of
risk,...." We hold that by enacting the above statutory provisions and
establishing a comparative negligence system, the Utah Legislature has by
necessary implication abolished the open and obvious danger rule as an
absolute bar to an injured guest's recovery.
780 P.2d at 1279 (emphasis added).
The court went on to note that applying the open and obvious danger rule as an
absolute bar "is fundamentally incompatible with a comparative negligence scheme,
which requires the finder of fact to allocate liability for an injury based on the relative

i

responsibility of the parties involved." Id. Additionally, the court stated that the fact that
an open and obvious danger existed could be considered as a secondary matter in
determining the comparative negligence of the parties.
In rendering its opinion in the present case, the court of appeals concluded that the
supreme court had overruled Donahue and that the open and obvious danger rule
therefore precluded Hale from any type of recovery. The court of appeals' conclusion
with respect to the viability of Donahue was based primarily upon its reading of this
Court's opinion in House v. Armour ofAmerica, Inc., 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996).
However, this Court did not overrule Donahue in House. The court of appeals'
determination that it did so, sub silento, is contrary to the express language of this Court
in House and the legislative intent of the comparative negligence statute as well as settled
premises liability law in Utah. This Court in House mentions Donahue only briefly to
distinguish House from Donahue as House was a strict products liability claim whereas
Donahue was a premises liability case. See House, 929 P,2d at 344. By its own terms,
this Court's discussion of the open and obvious danger rule in House was centered around
strict products liability only. Id.
In House, it was argued the manufacturer's failure to warn the plaintiffs decedent
about the inherent limitations of a bullet proof vest resulted in a violation of a duty to
warn owed by a commercial supplier. This Court states that in the limited circumstance
of strict products liability the open and obvious danger rule could be applied to bar
recovery. The reasoning was that manufacturers of somefinishedproducts that are
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patently dangerous by design cannot be economically designed in a safe manner. As
such, manufacturers of such products should not be liable to warn that their products are
patently dangerous. See House, 929 P.2d at 344 (Emphasis added).
By way of example, this Court identified knives as such a product. Knives are
designed to cut things and a manufacturer of knives should not be liable for the fact that
knives are sharp. There is no way a manufacturer of a knife can economically make the
knife "unsharp." This reasoning makes sense in the context of strict products liability and
continues to take into account the duty a manufacturer has to make products safe when it
is economically feasible.
However, it does not translate equally into premises liability analysis. It is not the
same to argue that unenclosed second-floor balconies are designed to be fallen off of and
that the landowner should not be liable for the fact that a person who is on the premises
by the landowner's invitation indeed falls off of the balcony. One major factor that
dropped out of the court of appeals5 analysis completely in the premises liability context
is whether it would have been economically feasible for the landowner to protect against
the foreseeable harm. Indeed, a $10.00 - $20.00 2x4 temporary railing as used at most
construction sites would have been economically feasible to protect Hale and the other
workers from the unprotected balcony.
In House, this Court simply distinguished the application of premises liability
principles to strict liability issues. House did not overrule Donahue by implication or
otherwise. Moroever, Donahue is consistent with the subsequent case law that has

9

addressed premises liability issues. The critical point of reference is that a person who is
in possession of land and is responsible for creating a hazard on the land owes a duty to
those he invites onto his land. Under Utah's comparative negligence statute, the
respective fault of the parties is then weighed by the finder of fact. See Laws v. Blanding
City, 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah Ct App. 1995).
Indeed, sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts have always
articulated viable principles of public policy relating to how the duty of care is distributed
between the possessor of land and his invitee. Hale has never argued otherwise. Donahue
never abandoned the approach set forth in sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement.
The opinion in Donahue makes it clear that the open and obvious danger rule was
abolished to the extent, and only to the extent, the rule would have operated as an
absolute bar to an injured guest's recovery. See Donahue, 780 P.2d at 1280.
The proper application of Donahue and its progeny necessarily requires a factual
determination regarding the reasonableness of the parties "under all the circumstances."
Donahue, 780 P.2d at 1280. The court in Donahue specifically directed the finder of fact
in that case to consider not only the existence of the open and obvious clanger, but what
precautions, if any, were taken by the landowner to prevent injury arising from the open
and obvious danger. Id. Likewise, the court in Laws v. Blanding City, 893 P.2d 1083
(Utah App. 1995) overturned a jury verdict because the jury instruction did not give the
finder of fact the ability to consider all the circumstances.2
2

The court of appeals took umbrage with Hale for not presenting evidence regarding how
Hale's presence on Beckstead's property required a deliberate encounter with the unprotected
10

In Laws v. Blanding City, 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah Ct. App.1995), plaintiff initiated an
action against the defendant city, alleging he was injured as a result of the defendant's
negligence in the construction and maintenance of the city dump. The jury returned a
verdict for the city, concluding that the city was not negligent. On appeal, plaintiff
contended that the trial court had committed prejudicial error in giving Instruction No. 17
which was taken substantially verbatim from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343.
The plaintiff argued that if subsection (b) of section 343 is not read in conjunction with
the language of section 343 A, it creates the misleading impression that if the plaintiff did
not realize or protect himself against the danger, the city's duty was abrogated. The court
of appeals agreed.
After quoting section 343 A and accompanying comments/and g, the court
concluded that the trial court had erred in giving the challenged instruction as it was an
incomplete and thus misleading statement of the city's duty. The question of whether or
not a reasonable person would, recognizing the danger, nevertheless encounter it, was a
question for the jury. Laws, 893 P.2d at 1086. In response to the defendant city's
contention that the district court's comparative negligence instruction, together with the
special verdict form, had cured any deficiency in the duty instruction, the court of appeals

balcony. Hale, 2003 UT App. 240 ^ 20, fh 4. The procedural history of this issue was
Defendant's motion for summary judgment on whether the landowner owed a duty of care to his
guests. The weight of Hale's evidence was not at issue in the original motion for summary
judgmentfiledby Beckstead upon which the ensuing appeals are based. The original issue,
couched in terms of the landowner's duty - or lack thereof, was whether the trier of fact could, as
a matter of law, consider all the circumstances. This is exactly the point the court of appeals
misses in its failure to apply Donahue or sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement correctly.
11

cited Donahue with approval, declaring:
If the jury determined that Defendant owed no duty of reasonable care to
Plaintiff based on the incomplete statement of duty found in Instruction No.
17, then neither the comparative negligence instruction nor the special
verdict form would have been helpful. "There would be no negligence to
compare-and, therefore, no recovery'5 if Defendant's duty were erroneously
excused because the danger is known or obvious. See [Donahue, 780 P.2d]
at 1279. We conclude that the instructions as a whole inadequately
presented the law with respect to Defendant's duty of care and undermined
Plaintiffs ability to present his theory of the case to the jury.
Laws, 893 P.2d at 1086.
In this case, Beckstead was the landowner and general contractor. He was
responsible for the state of construction in his house at the time that he invited Hale onto
his property for the purpose of painting the interior of his house. Hale, who was only on
the premises to perform this contractual service, had no control over the property other
than to paint. Specifically, Hale did not have responsibility for or control over the
construction of the second floor balcony or installation of a rail. Further, Beckstead has
not offered any evidence as to steps he took to protect against the risk of falling from the
unprotected balcony. Instead, Beckstead appears to argue that he owes no duty, among
other reasons, because he was on vacation when Hale got injured.
Beckstead, and not Hale, created the risk of danger by maintaining the unenclosed
balcony and inviting Beckstead to paint in that area. This is not to say that Hale may not
bear some fault for falling off of the balcony. However, Beckstead is not an innocent
party who should be relieved of all liability simply because Hale mis-stepped while
painting.
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But this is how the court of appeals has applied sections 343 and 343 A of the
Restatement in the absence of Donahue and under its reading of the supreme court's strict
products liability analysis in House v. Armour of America, Inc., supra. In addition, the
court of appeals tacitly nullifies all factors except the factor at issue in Laws which are
identified in the comments to section 343 A of the Restatement that would allow the finder
of fact to take all the circumstances into account when an invitee deliberately encounters
a known hazard. Hale, 2003 UT App. 240 <{[ 18. Moreover, the court of appeals goes on
to explain that a business invitee can never overcome the open and obvious danger rule,
essentially making no distinction as far as the landowner is concerned between a busmess
mvitee and a mere trespasser. Specifically, the court of appeals cites to a Minnesota case,
Sutherland v. Barton, 570 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1997) for the proposition that a business
invitee can never overcome a complete bar to recovery under the "deliberate encounter"
exception.3
In holding that Beckstead owed Hale no duty whatsoever the court of appeals has
rendered the open and obvious danger rule an "all OT nothing" doctrine that would deny
Plaintiff any recovery without regard to the reasonableness of the respective parties'

3

What the court of appeals fails to acknowledge is that Sutherland is identical to
Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999), and Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408
(1914), which the court of appeals expressly stated did not dispose of the issue regarding Hale's
status as a business invitee. See Hale, 2003 UT App 240 at \ 11, fh 2. Like the injured parties in
Thompson and Dayton, the decedent in Sutherland was the employee of an independent
contractor who was killed because of the manner he undertook to perform the specialized job the
independent contractor was hired to do. The ultimate conclusion of the Minnesota court was
that "as a matter of law [the landowner] owed no duty to Sutherland, an independent contractor's
employee." Sutherland, 570 N.W.2d at 7-8 (Emphasis added).
13

conduct. Such a conclusion is not in harmony with the authorities that have considered
the application of other "all or nothing" doctrines in the framework of Utah's comparative
negligence scheme. In addition, the court of appeals5 conclusion replaces the
Legislature's authority to pass law with that of the Court of Appeals.
Common law rules that once may have provided a complete defense in a
negligence action still have relevance under Utah's comparative negligence system. For
example, in Jacobsen Const, v. Structo-Lite Engineering, 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980), the
supreme court noted:
We thus hold that under our comparative negligence statute "assumption of
risk" language is not appropriate to describe the various concepts previously
dealt with under that terminology but is to be treated, in its secondary sense,
as contributory negligence. Specifically, and with particular reference to
our comparative negligence act, the reasonableness of plaintiff s conduct in
confronting a known or unknown risk created by defendant's negligence
will basically be determined under principles of contributory negligence.
Attention should be focused on whether a reasonably prudent man in the
exercise of due care would have incurred the risk, despite his knowledge of
it, and if so, whether he would have conducted himself in the manner in
which the plaintiff acted in light of all the surrounding circumstances,
including the appreciated risk. Then, if plaintiff s unreasonableness is
viewed to be less than that of defendant, according to the terms of the
statute, "any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering."
Id. at 312 (citation omitted).
In Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982), the supreme court concluded that
the doctrine of last clear chance as a distinct tort doctrine was extinguished with the
enactment of Utah's comparative negligence act declaring that "assumption of risk, last
clear chance, and discovered peril resemble the old contributory negligence doctrine in

14

that they are 'all or nothing5 doctrines in terms of recovery by the plaintiff.55 Id. at 598.
Nevertheless, the court stated:
Our decision here does not preclude argument to the jury as to whether a
party may or may not have had the "last clear chance" to avoid injury.
However, the old "all or nothing55 doctrine is now subsumed within
comparative negligence and, as bearing on which party was guilty of the
greater negligence, "last clear chance55 becomes just one of many factors to
be weighed in the comparison by the finder of fact.
Id. at 598, fti. 7.
The abolition of the open and obvious danger rule as an absolute bar does not
mean that the underlying principles of public policy relating to how the duty of care is
distributed between the possessor of land and his invitee are likewise abolished. Clearly,
the conduct of one who voluntarily assumes a known risk remains relevant in the context
of comparative negligence notwithstanding the fact that his assumption of such risk may
no longer be asserted as an absolute bar to his recovery. Likewise, the open and obvious
danger rule remains relevant as one of the factors to be considered in weighing the
claimant's negligence in approaching the danger and the landowner's failure to abate it.
This case, like Donahue, illustrates why the open and obvious danger should
continue to operate as a factor, and not a complete bar to recovery, in premises liability
cases. This is especially true where Hale, as a business invitee, was more than a mere
trespasser on the property. Under Utah's comparative negligence act, as well as a
complete reading of sections 343 and 343 A, the finder of fact should consider all the
circumstances, including what steps, if any, Beckstead took to protect against the risk of
danger.
15

CONCLUSION
Based upon the forgoing it is respectfully submitted that the court of appeals erred
in concluding that Donahue v. Durfee had been effectively overruled. Accordingly the
decision of the court of appeals should be reversed.
DATED this \V

day of March, 2004.

V^A^ron J. Prisb:
Elizabeth B. Gri:
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the j~t) day of day of March, 2004, two (2) copies of the
foregoing PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON CERTIORARI were mailed, postage prepaid, as
follows:
Bryan J. Pattison
Brent M. Brindley
Durham Jones & Pinegar
192 East 200 North, Third Floor
P.O. Box 400
St. George, UT 84771-0400

'A^

)N J.

P:

Attorney for

16

oner

I hereby certify that no addendum is required for the Petitioner's Brief on Certiorari in the matter
o[John D. Hahrv^JCurt Beckstead, Supreme Court Case No, 20030641-SC

